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DEMOCRACY WITHOUT A NET?





I. STRUCTURAL BACKUP SYSTEMS IN A DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION
A basic design premise of the United States Constitution is
that the main constitutional mechanism for assuring good
governance is democratic accountability through elections. As
Madison put it, "[a] dependence on the people is, no doubt, the
primary control on the government."' These primary systems,
when they work properly, are expected to produce good
government through the installation in power of good rulers who
will rule for the common benefit of all. Democratic systems will
thus produce "a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best
discern the true interest of their country and whose patriotism
and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary
or partial considerations. ' 2
A second design premise of the Constitution, however, is that
the primary system may fail: "the effect may be inverted. Men of
factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs,
* Professor of Law and William J. Magavern Faculty Scholar, State University
of New York, University at Buffalo Law School. A draft of this paper was presented
to the faculty of St. John's University School of Law on September 27, 2004 as part
of the St. John's Law Review Distinguished Scholars Series. An earlier version was
also presented at the University at Buffalo Law School as part of a Faculty Seminar
on Institutional Analysis, held under the auspices of the Christopher Baldy Center
for Law and Social Policy. My thanks to the participants in both workshops for their
comments, especially Lynn Mather. I additionally wish to thank Neal Devins and
Bob Goodin for comments on an early draft, and Devon Runyan for research
assistance.
' THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Arlington House 1966).
2 Id. No. 10, at 82 (James Madison).
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may... first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the interests
of the people."3 This possibility, along with hard experience, "has
taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions."4
Consequently, the Constitution contains, in addition to the
primary mechanisms of democratic accountability, a set of
backup systems designed to limit the ability of bad rulers to do
serious harm to the public good. These backup systems include
the horizontal separation of powers, federalism, the protection of
specific individual liberties in the Bill of Rights, and an
independent judiciary.
To perform properly under the conditions for which they are
designed-conditions which are, by definition, unpromising for
the general good-these backup systems must be robust. That is,
such systems cannot depend for their success on political actors
complying with constitutional norms, for the very situations in
which backup systems are called upon to operate are those in
which the actors in question are by hypothesis willing to violate
prevailing constitutional norms. This means that a
constitutional backup system, if it is to be effective, must be self-
sustaining: it must be able to survive and to operate, without
significant degradation, in the face of strategic behavior by
political actors designed to evade the constraints it imposes on
bad behavior. Effective backup systems must therefore operate
independently of primary democratic systems; because they are
needed precisely when democratic mechanisms have failed, they
cannot depend for their success on democratic modes of behavior,
but must operate instead on different principles.
A key premise of this kind of dual structural arrangement-
and the one I wish to examine in this paper-is that the function
of democracy consists mainly in the selection of officials. On this
model, democratic mechanisms provide system inputs in the form
of officials who either are good-wise, virtuous, patriotic-or not.
This input then gets fed into the governance mechanism,
producing good government in one of two ways. If the democratic
subsystem works well and the democratically chosen officials are
good, constitutional governance mechanisms produce good
governance affirmatively, by enabling well-selected officials to
take good actions' purposefully, in accordance with their
3 Id.
4 Id. No. 51, at 322 (James Madison).
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character.' If, on the other hand, the democratic subsystem
works poorly, and the democratically chosen officials are bad,
constitutional governance mechanisms still produce good
governance negatively (or at least negate the possibility of bad
governance) by operation of the backup system, which disables
badly selected officials from taking actions, again consistent with
their character, that are harmful to the public good.
I shall argue below that this view of the role of democracy in
the constitutional structure is too narrow, and that the effect of
democracy on the operation of constitutional systems cannot
plausibly be confined to those specific subsystems intended to
operate by overtly democratic means. Democracy is much more
powerful than this view gives it credit for: it is capable of
shaping the institutional environment in ways that affect the
operation not only of those systems designed to operate
democratically, but also the operation of systems, such as
structural backup mechanisms, that are designed to operate
independently of democratic influences. At least this has been
the case with the purportedly self-sustaining backup systems of
the U.S. Constitution, most notably the separation of powers,
which will be my focus here.
More specifically, my thesis is that the U.S. Constitution's
structural backup systems have never worked as originally
contemplated, and a significant reason is that democratic
institutional norms, and the associated modalities of democratic
politics, have crowded out the behavior on which the stability of
such structural systems by design depends. Democratic norms,
in other words, have seeped into portions of the constitutional
mechanism that were designed to operate in their absence,
' The problem of how to design institutions so as to best assure that they are
populated by individuals who possess certain specifically desired characteristics has
not been much discussed in the literature of institutional design. Much of the
institutional design literature begins from Hume's premise of human knavery-that
"in contriving any system of government... every man ought to be supposed a
knave, and to have no other end, in all his actions, than private interest." David
Hume, Of the Independency of Parliament, in ESSAYS: MORAL, POLITICAL, AND
LITERARY 42, 42 (rev. ed. 1987). Some recent useful exceptions are Geoffrey
Brennan, Selection and the Currency of Reward, in THE THEORY OF INSTITUTIONAL
DESIGN 257-58 (Robert E. Goodin ed., 1996), Philip Pettit, Institutional Design and
Rational Choice, in THE THEORY OF INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 55 (Robert E. Goodin ed.,
1996), and ADRIAN VERMEULE, SELECTION EFFECTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2-3
(U. Chi. Pub. L. & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 60, 2004), at
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/academics/publiclaw/resources/60-Vermule.pdf.
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significantly altering their manner of operation, and to a great
degree, subverting their effectiveness. Our backup systems, that
is to say, have broken down and we cannot depend on them to
work as originally intended. The bad news is that we are thus
far more dependent on the success of democratic processes than
the constitutional design plan suggests. The good news,
however, is that democratic norms are, or at least can be, much
more robust than the constitutional plan contemplates, and that
we probably need not fear as strongly as did the founders that a
failure of democracy will degenerate so quickly or so certainly
into tyranny.
II. SEPARATION OF POWERS AS A SELF-SUSTAINING
CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM
A. The Claim of Systemic Self-Perpetuation
A highly desirable feature of a constitution is durability, so it
is not surprising that one of the more common claims made on
behalf of constitutions is that they are self-perpetuating, and will
therefore last indefinitely. Certainly, the U.S. Constitution
prominently makes such a claim about itself: it declares its
purposes to include "secur[ing] the Blessings of Liberty to
ourselves and our Posterity. ''6  This claim is remarkably
ambitious. Unlike, say, the Ten Commandments, which purport
to provide a blueprint for a good life only so long as we obey
them, the U.S. Constitution claims something stronger: that
collective submission to its regime activates a system that will
continue permanently, by some process of self-perpetuation,
whether or not we live up to the obligations it asks of us-it is "a
machine that would go of itself."7 Consequently, to receive its
benefits, we need not continually and self-consciously obey its
injunctions to good behavior, but instead need only submit to and
remain under its authority-a much easier task.
As strongly as these claims of self-perpetuation are made on
behalf of constitutions as integrated systems, they are typically
made with even greater force for certain constitutional
subsystems, most notably the separation of powers. Because
6 U.S. CONST. pmbl.
7 MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD Go OF ITSELF: THE
CONSTITUTION IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1986).
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"[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and
judiciary, in the same hands... may justly be pronounced the
very definition of tyranny,"8 it is imperative that power be
divided not merely at the inception of a constitutional regime,
but throughout its life. The separation of powers established by
the U.S. Constitution is said to deploy "a single, finely wrought
and exhaustively considered, procedure" 9 in which power is so
carefully--one might even say scientifically'°-divided and
balanced that it will remain so divided permanently.1"
Strangely, the claim that separation of powers is self-
perpetuating is almost never seriously questioned in the field of
constitutional law, either by scholars or by actors in the system.
Occasionally, questions have been raised about whether judicial
intervention in interbranch disputes is advisable,1 2 but such
questions ask only whether separation of powers is fully self-
sustaining, or only partially so in that it requires occasional
judicial tweaking to keep the machinery of self-sustainment in
good working condition; such questions accept, that is to say, the
underlying claim of self-sustainment. 3 Yet to claim that a
8 THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 47, at 301 (James Madison).
9 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
'0 On the Framers' belief in science as a guiding principle, see GORDON S.
WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, 593-615 (1969). See
also PAUL W. KAHN, LEGITIMACY AND HISTORY: SELF-GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY (1992), at 12 and ch. 1 generally.
" See Victoria Nourse, Toward a "Due Foundation" for the Separation of
Powers: The Federalist Papers as Political Narrative, 74 TEX. L. REV. 447, 483
(1996) ("Madison believed that the system would be largely self-regulating, that any
department that sought openly to steal another's power would be met with swift
reprisals.").
12 Compare JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL
PROCESS 275 (1980) ("[P]articipation of the Supreme Court is unnecessary to police
constitutional violations by one political department against the other. Each
branch.., has tremendous incentives jealously to guard its constitutional
boundaries.., against invasion by the other."), with Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth
J. Cisar, "If Angels Were to Govern" The Need for Pragmatic Formalism in
Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449, 487 (1991) (arguing that at least in
certain situations "the only means of assuring the prevention of branch usurpation
is by judicial enforcement of separation of powers").
13 A different view appears in some recent work on constitutional design. See,
e.g., MIKHAIL FILIPPOV, PETER C. ORDESHOOK & OLGA SHVETSOVA, DESIGNING
FEDERALISM: A THEORY OF SELF-SUSTAINABLE FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS 335 (2004)
("Even if design succeeds in having ambition counter ambition so that the internal
dynamics of the federal government maintain the balance we build into its design, a
constitutional document needs a source of global enforcement so that it can resist
the varied winds that tear at its fabric."). The authors do not, however, look
2005]
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constitutional mechanism is really capable of sustaining itself,
even against attempts to overthrow it, is to claim something
quite remarkable. What can it actually mean? Is such a thing
possible, and if so, how?
B. The Mechanics of a Self-Sustaining Separation of Powers
The basic mechanism by which the separation of powers is
said to sustain itself is so well known that it has become a
favorite bromide of constitutional law: "Ambition must be made
to counteract ambition."' 4 In such a system, says Madison, "the
great security against a gradual concentration of the several
powers in the same department consists in giving to those who
administer each department the necessary constitutional means
and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others."' 5
Separation of powers, then, works by equipping the various
actors in the governance system in such a way that any attempt
by actors in one branch to accumulate a dangerous amount of
power will be immediately resisted and, it is hoped, successfully
beaten back by actors in other branches defending their own
authority. But though the general account is familiar, it is
extremely abstract. Leaving aside the difficulty in attempting to
discern the boundaries of each branch's power, this account
leaves open many important questions. Why, precisely, and
under what circumstances, might actors in one branch seek to
expand their power by appropriating powers exercised by other
branches? How, and by what means, might one branch seek to
exercise authority allocated formally to another? By what means
do branches subjected to such an attack repel it? What
persuades a branch whose attempted encroachment has been
resisted to give up the effort? Can no usurpation ever succeed,
and if not, why not?
Answering these questions is complicated by the fact that
the separation of powers may contribute by several different
routes to the ultimate constitutional goal of good governance. In
necessarily to the judiciary as a source of such enforcement on the ground that a
judicial branch created by a constitution is itself a player in "the political game in
which a constitution is embedded." See id.; see also id. at 151-57. Instead, they
argue that good constitutional design will create constitutional institutions that
have a self-reinforcing relationship with preexisting social and political institutions
in the society to be governed. Id. at 142-50.
14 THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 51, at 322 (James Madison).
'5 Id. at 321-22.
[Vol. 79:293
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the narrowest sense, the separation of powers contributes to good
governance only indirectly, by blocking the fulfillment of one
especially potent condition for the emergence of tyranny-the
concentration of government power. 6 On this view, divided
government does not necessarily produce good government in the
sense of good measures; it produces at most non-tyrannical
government, a situation by no means inconsistent with
governmental ineptitude, or worse. On the other hand, the
separation of powers may be capable of contributing much more
directly to good governance. For example, by giving each branch
the authority to veto measures sought by the others, the
separation of powers may serve as a kind of filtration mechanism
guaranteeing that only measures which unequivocally serve the
general good will be enacted. 17 An even stronger view holds that
the dispersion of government authority creates a path-dependent
governmental decision-making structure that, by requiring any
significant action to be preceded by interbranch consultation and
deliberation, inevitably improves the quality of decisions.18
Because these more expansive understandings of separation of
powers greatly complicate any attempt to analyze its workings, I
shall confine myself here to considering it in the first and
narrower sense: as accomplishing nothing more than securing a
precondition for non-tyranny.
By what mechanism, then, does the separation of powers, so
understood, sustain itself? Clearly, if separation of powers is to
sustain itself, then powers divided must stay divided. But how?
Unfortunately, the picture painted by the Framers is rather
short on specifics. 9  Power, Madison tells us, "is of an
16 See id. No. 47, at 301 (James Madison).
17 See id. No. 73, at 443 (Alexander Hamilton) (stating that executive veto power
"furnishes an additional security against the enaction of improper laws" and its
effect is "to increase the chances in favor of the community against the passing of
bad laws"); cf. JOHN C. CALHOUN, A DISQUISITION ON GOVERNMENT 20 (C. Gordon
Post ed., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1953) (1853) (arguing that the only effective way to
prevent governmental tyranny is "by dividing and distributing the powers of
government, [to] give to each division or interest, through its appropriate organ,
either a concurrent voice in making and executing the laws or a veto on their
execution").
18 See JOSEPH M. BESSETTE, THE MILD VOICE OF REASON: DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY AND AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 29-30, 232-33 (1994); CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 22-24 (1993).
'9 The Framers' vagueness concerning how the separation of powers would
actually operate has been much commented upon. See generally Daryl J. Levinson,
Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915 (2005);
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encroaching nature, 20 and cannot be confined by "parchment
barriers.,,21 The legislature is "everywhere extending the sphere
of its activity and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex,,
22
while the executive pursues an "all-grasping prerogative. 23
Hamilton expected interbranch relations to be a "trial of
strength '24 in which the legislature will "attack" the executive.
If nothing else, this language indicates that the Framers
anticipated interbranch relations to be conducted on something
approaching a war footing, at least on occasion. But how was
such a war to be carried out?
The closest Madison comes to providing any details is a
reference he makes in Federalist 48 to a 1783 report of the
Pennsylvania Council of Censors, a body charged under the
Pennsylvania Constitution with meeting every seven years to
review the compliance of government organs with the
constitution and to recommend amendments.26 Madison relies on
this report to support his contention that the branches of
government, if left unrestrained, will not observe the
constitutional boundaries of their respective powers, so it may
provide some insight into how he thought interbranch warfare
might occur. According to Madison, the report shows that in
Pennsylvania "[e]xecutive powers had been usurped., 27 Although
Madison does not specify what evidence shows usurpation, the
Censors' report lists several incidents that might qualify. For
example, on a few occasions the legislature statutorily reassigned
executive duties to other government actors; appointed officers
that the constitution required to be appointed by the executive;
exercised the executive pardoning power; and expended money
directly, without first appropriating it from the treasury, a
function that the Censors characterized as clearly executive
under the state constitution.28 In these instances, then, one
M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of Powers Law, 150
U. PA. L. REV. 603 (2001); M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of
Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1127 (2000); Nourse, supra note 11.
20 THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 48, at 308 (James Madison).
21 Id.
22 Id. at 309.
23 id.
24 Id. No. 73, at 444 (Alexander Hamilton).
25 Id. at 445.
26 PA. CONST. § 47 (1776).
27 THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 48, at 312 (James Madison).
28 THE PROCEEDINGS RELATIVE TO CALLING THE CONVENTIONS OF 1776 AND
[Vol. 79:293
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branch usurped powers allocated to another simply by proceeding
to exercise them and, apparently, hoping for, or insisting upon,
compliance.
The Pennsylvania Censors' account, and Madison and
Hamilton's description of interbranch relations, contain obvious
echoes of an earlier series of events well known to the colonists:
the English Civil War. In a bitter conflict between the Crown
and Parliament, each in turn attempted to acquire and exercise
powers traditionally held by the other. For over a decade, for
example, Charles I did not convene a parliament,29 an
extraordinary measure for English kings, who needed
parliamentary authorization to obtain revenue.
3" Charles
attempted to get around this problem by imposing new kinds of
taxes on his own authority, without parliamentary approval.
3'
When the Long Parliament met in 1640, it retaliated by
declaring itself the supreme political authority, demanded the
power to appoint royal ministers, and eventually fielded and
commanded its own army.32 This led eventually to interbranch
warfare in the most literal sense, with the king and parliament
commanding rival armies engaged in a struggle for control over
the state.33
Although it is unclear whether the Framers actually
contemplated a military clash between the President and
Congress, they clearly did contemplate the possibility of armed
conflict as a method of resolving disputes between actors in the
Constitution's other main structural backup system, federalism.
In Federalist 46, Madison went so far as to estimate the size of a
1790: THE MINUTES OF THE CONVENTION THAT FORMED THE PRESENT
CONSTITUTION OF PENNSYLVANIA, TOGETHER WITH THE CHARTER TO WILLIAM PENN,
THE CONSTITUTIONS OF 1776 AND 1790, AND A VIEW OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
CONVENTION OF 1776, AND THE COUNCIL OF CENSORS, at 100-06 (1825).
29 Charles dissolved Parliament in 1629, and did not reconvene it until 1640.
MAURICE ASHLEY, THE ENGLISH CIVIL WAR: A CONCISE HISTORY 14, 35-44 (1974).
30 See G.L. Harriss, The Formation of Parliament, 1272-1377, in THE ENGLISH
PARLIAMENT IN THE MIDDLE AGES 29, 41 (R.G. Davies & J.H. Denton eds., 1981); 2
WILLIAM STUBBS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 248-52 (W.S. Hein &
Co. 3d ed. 1987) (1880).
31 See ASHLEY, supra note 29, at 14, 35.
32 See id. at 63-64 ("Parliament sought ultimate sovereignty."); C.V.
WEDGWOOD, THE KING'S WAR, 1641-1647, at 31, 41-42, 70-72 (1958).
33 An exceedingly thorough account may be found in the four volumes of
SAMUEL R. GARDINER, HISTORY OF THE GREAT CIVIL WAR 1642-1649 (AMS Press
1965) (1893). A more recent and concise account appears in WEDGWOOD, supra note
32.
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military force the national government might plausibly field,
arguing that it would be a small fraction of the armed militia
forces available to the states.34 Hamilton went even further,
arguing that the states would have important tactical
advantages over any national army called up to suppress them:
If the federal army should be able to quell the resistance of one
State, the distant States would be able to make head with fresh
forces. The advantages obtained in one place must be
abandoned to subdue the opposition in others; and the moment
the part which had been reduced to submission was left to itself,
35its efforts would be renewed, and its resistance revive.
Not surprisingly, then, the Framers conceived of the use of
power in terms that were familiar to them from their experience
and from their theoretical understanding of political relations.
For them, holders of great political power existed with respect to
one another in something like the state of nature, a state of
nature that was distinctly Hobbesian-a constant war of all
against all in which those with considerable power seek to obtain
more, and those with less power attempt to hang on to what they
have.36 The Framers' political psychology thus resembled a kind
of imperial expansionism,37 based on the model of political
relations they knew best. If you seize my possession in Minorca,
I will not only attempt to regain it, but will retaliate by attacking
your possessions in Toronto and Niagara. If you attack me off
the British coast, I will repel you, and immediately invade your
possessions in the Caribbean.38 Power, in this formulation, is
conceived territorially, and disputes over power are conducted
like turf wars.
In developing and applying this model to the design of
constitutional backup mechanisms, the Framers apparently saw
" THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 46 (James Madison), at 299 (noting that
reasonable assumptions about the ability of a nation to raise an army suggest that
such efforts "would not yield, in the United States, an army of more than twenty-five
or thirty thousand men. To these would be opposed a militia [in the several states]
amounting to near half a million of citizens with arms in their hands").
" Id. No. 28, at 181 (Alexander Hamilton).
36 See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 104-09 (Herbert W. Schneider ed., The
Liberal Arts Press 1958) (1651).
37 Daryl Levinson has aptly termed this "empire-building." Levinson, supra
note 19.
38 These are events from the Seven Years War from 1756 to 1763, in which
many American revolutionaries had personally participated. See generally WILLIAM
R. NESTER, THE FIRST GLOBAL WAR (2000).
302 [Vol. 79:293
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little difference between the structure they were designing,
which involved dividing power internally within a single political
society, and the structure of power relations among independent
nations, such as rival European great powers. In each case, a
sphere of power was conceived territorially, as something
political actors would attempt to invade or defend. That is why,
according to Madison, internally divided powers could never
remain divided unless "[t]he interest of the man [is] connected
with the constitutional rights of the place."3
9 In other words,
political actors must be given the same kind of stake in defending
their allotted plot of power as monarchs have in defending their
realms. When that is done, the behavior of a Congress or a
President becomes just as predictable as the behavior of a prince,
and therefore just as susceptible to containment through a
careful initial allocation and balancing of power.
III. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS IN ACTUAL OPERATION
In fact, the separation of powers never worked in the way the
Framers contemplated: their assumptions about how political
actors would behave were falsified from the very inception of an
operational American republicanism. Contrary to design
assumptions, presidents have not routinely made brazen
attempts to usurp legislative power, and congresses have not
willy-nilly enacted laws appropriating for their own use powers
that properly belong to the executive or judicial branches. The
turf-encroaching and turf-defending skirmishes on which the
self-sustaining aspect of the separation of powers system depends
never materialized. In the words of one leading expert on
American executive-legislative relations, "[d]espite the heavy
traffic, head-on collisions are rare. Instead, individual drivers
merge safely at high speeds."4 °  This is not to say that the
branches of the federal government have never clashed; they
have. But these clashes have been on the whole relatively minor
and restrained disagreements at the margins of interbranch
relations, which have been overwhelmingly cooperative rather
than conflictual.4'
"9 THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 51, at 322 (James Madison).
40 Louis FISHER, THE POLITICS OF SHARED POWER: CONGRESS AND THE
EXECUTIVE, at xi (Tex. A&M Univ. Press 4th ed. 1998).
41 For a description of late twentieth-century "norms of inter-branch cooperation
within the national government," see Peter M. Shane, When Inter-Branch Norms
2005]
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This tone was set early. The relations between President
Washington and the first Congresses were characterized by a
punctilious observance of the boundaries of divided power, even
as those boundaries were being explored and defined for the first
time.42 President Jefferson went so far as to urge Congress to be
more specific in its appropriations so as to curtail the scope of
executive discretion, 43 and began a practice of delivering his
annual state of the union message to Congress in writing rather
than in person, lest the personal presence of the President exert
undue influence on legislative independence." Even actions of
indeterminate constitutionality, such as Jefferson's unilateral
agreement to purchase the Louisiana Territory, were undertaken
amicably, and with subsequent congressional acquiescence.45
This pattern has persisted. For example, President
Truman's 1952 seizure of the steel industry, later found by the
Supreme Court to be an unconstitutional usurpation of
legislative power, was accomplished with the knowledge and
apparent acquiescence of Congress.46 Even what was perhaps the
most bitter executive-legislative confrontation in American
history, President Andrew Johnson's administration of
Reconstruction, was conducted using constitutional tools, up to
and including impeachment, that were indubitably within the
authority of the political actors involved.47 None of the other
Break Down: Of Arms-for-Hostages, "Orderly Shutdowns," Presidential
Impeachments, and Judicial "Coups," 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POLY 503, 505-13
(2003). Shane goes on to argue that these norms have, in the last two decades,
showed signs of strain. Id. at 514-33.
42 See Gerhard Casper, An Essay in Separation of Powers: Some Early Versions
and Practices, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211, 224-33 (1989).
43 See Gerhard Casper, Executive-Congressional Separation of Power During the
Presidency of Thomas Jefferson, 47 STAN. L. REV. 473, 484 (1995).
4 See id. at 478-80.
45 For an account of the course of events leading to the purchase, see MARSHALL
SPRAGUE, SO VAST AND BEAUTIFUL A LAND: LOUISIANA AND THE PURCHASE ch. 19
(1974). A thorough account of contemporary doubts about the constitutionality of
the acquisition, and Congress's decision to ratify the purchase in spite of those
doubts, may be found in EVERETT S. BROWN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE
LOUISIANA PURCHASE, 1803-1812, at 62-65 (1920).
46 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587-89 (1952).
When President Truman issued a seizure order, however, Congress did not act. See
MAEVA MARCUS, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE 94-99 (1977) (discussing
congressional inaction following Truman's seizure order); HARRY S. TRUMAN,
MEMOIRS BY HARRY S. TRUMAN:YEARS OF TRIAL AND HOPE 472-74 (1956) (recalling
the shutdown of the steel mills and his desires for congressional action).
47 According to one leading authority, throughout the Johnson impeachment
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conflicts between the branches that we think of as major-the
national bank controversy during the Jackson Administration,
Roosevelt's court-packing plan, the impoundment controversy
during the Nixon presidency-look much like the bald-faced
seizures of authority for which the Framers so carefully designed.
The lack of evidence of imperial expansionism by any of the
branches over such a long period of time might be taken as a sign
that the primary constitutional system for achieving good
government-a democratic electoral system-has worked
exceedingly well; that is, the people have by and large tended to
choose the right kind of individuals to exercise, public power, so
that structural backup mechanisms have rarely or never been
called into play. Overt provocation of other power holders is
probably not, after all, the hallmark of enlightened
statesmanship. While it is conceivable that this explanation
might have something to do with the way interbranch relations
have been conducted, it overlooks what is perhaps a much more
important point: American government officials generally have
not been required to engage in interbranch warfare to achieve
their objectives because interbranch boundaries have been
routinely ignored as a matter of convenience by all concerned.
Power has not been invaded, or seized, or appropriated, or fought
over, because the President and Congress have been quite willing
to share and swap powers, and to rearrange the constitutional
allocations to suit themselves. They have cooperated, but their
cooperation has as often been in colluding to efface interbranch
boundaries as in working together to respect 
them. 48
proceedings Congress displayed a commendable awareness of and concern 
for the
appropriate limits of its own powers. MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL
IMPEACHMENT PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 
55-56
(Univ. of Chi. Press 2d ed. 2000).
48 The process of government officials trading powers in order to achieve their
objectives has been likened to a Coasean trade of property entitlements. See Michael
A. Fitts, The Foibles of Formalism: Applying a Political "Transaction Cost"Analysis
to Separation of Powers, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1643, 1646-47 (1997); J. Gregory
Sidak, To Declare War, 41 DUKE L.J. 27, 63-73 (1991); Donald Wittman, 
The
Constitution as an Optimal Social Contract: A Transaction Cost Analysis of 
The
Federalist Papers, in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM 73,
75 (Bernard Grofman & Donald Wittman eds., 1989); see also Elisabeth R. Gerber 
&
Ken Kollman, Authority Migration: Defining an Emerging Research Agenda, 
PS:
POL. SCI. & POL. 397, 397-401 (2004) (defining the migration of political authority
within non-unitary regimes as a new field of study). According to this analogy,
treating the constitutional allocation of powers as merely a provisional allocation of
entitlements that their "owners" may later trade is efficient in that it allows the
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Today, the actual distribution of powers in our system looks
little like the one the Framers must have contemplated, and all
the major changes have been accomplished with the agreement
and participation of all the branches of government. The rise of
the administrative state, to name the most important example,
gave the President immense and previously unknown power.4 9
various powers of government to end up in the hands of those who value them most.
Presumably, government officials value specific powers for their utility in facilitating
the achievement of desired policy objectives. Of course, as Sidak makes clear, the
analogy to the Coase Theorem is imperfect in that the public is an important third-
party beneficiary of the Constitution's structural arrangements. Sidak, supra, at 67.
Still, if we were confident that the preferences of government officials closely
matched those of the general public, as a pure economic theory of democracy might
suggest, see generally ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY
(1957), the trading of powers might not pose a troubling problem. On the other hand,
a foundational behavioral premise of the system of separated powers is that
government officials will pursue their own personal self-interest at the expense of
the public good. See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 10 (James Madison).
49 See John Ferejohn, Madisonian Separation of Powers, in JAMES MADISON:
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT 126, 149 (Samuel Kernell
ed., 2003) ("[T]he congressional creation of executive agencies rapidly shifted
legislative advantages in the direction of the president and his henchmen."); see also
ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973) (documenting the
twentieth-century rise of presidential power). According to Justice Jackson, the rise
of the administrative sector "has deranged our three-branch legal theories." FTC v.
Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting). Indeed, it has been
argued that there is simply no way to reconcile the modern administrative state
with the original constitutional plan of divided powers. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The
Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1231 (1994) ("The
post-New Deal administrative state is unconstitutional, and its validation by the
legal system amounts to nothing less than a bloodless constitutional revolution.")
(citations omitted).
There is, to be sure, some disagreement about the extent to which the growth of
the administrative state has actually given the President the upper hand in his
relation with Congress. On one hand, simply because Congress has created
numerous administrative agencies in the executive branch does not necessarily
mean it has surrendered ultimate power to the President. Some scholars argue that
Congress has managed to retain a meaningful power of administrative oversight,
notwithstanding the great proliferation and activity of administrative agencies. See,
e.g., DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O'HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANSACTION
COST POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS 236-39
(1999); Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight
Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 165 (1984);
Thomas Schwartz, Checks, Balances, and Bureaucratic Usurpation of Congressional
Power, in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 48,
at 150-51. On the other hand, it has been frequently suggested that the
administrative bureaucracy is no more under the actual control of the President
than it is of Congress. See, e.g., M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS 399 (2d ed. 1998) ("[T]he so-called executive, the political
leaders nominally responsible to the legislature for the conduct of government, may
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Yet this power was not seized, but handed over. Legislation
creating and regulating the federal civil service drastically
curtailed presidential power by eliminating the President's
discretion to dispense patronage.50 The creation of independent
agencies similarly restricted presidential power." Congress has
for all intents and purposes voluntarily handed over to the
President its power to declare war. 2 The President routinely by
executive order issues commands that are legislative in
character.53 Federal courts ratified congressional creation of
Article I courts, an action that transferred power from the
judicial branch to the executive.54 Congress created hundreds of
legislative veto provisions with presidential approval.
5 Later, it
could scarcely contain its zeal to give the President a line-item
veto, an action that might have significantly altered the balance
of legislative and executive power.5 6 All of these actions were
undertaken cooperatively by Congress and the President, even
those that later were held by the courts to constitute usurpations
forbidden by the Constitution.
Why has this happened? Why haven't presidents and
legislatures plotted adversarially to capture broad swaths of
in practice have little real control over the government machine."). But such
disputes are really characterizations of the impact of the administrative state at the
margins of democratic oversight. Surely there can be no question but that the
growth of the administrative state created substantial new opportunities for
presidential influence over public policy that had not previously existed, regardless
of the course of legislative-executive contests for ultimate control of government
policy decisions.
50 See generally PAUL P. VAN RIPER, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CIVIL
SERVICE (1958) (discussing the history of American civil service reform).
51 See FISHER, supra note 40, at 146-76.
52 See id. at 191 ("The war power, originally grounded in Congress as the
representative branch, has in recent times gravitated more and more to the
executive branch."); see also JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY, at ix, 50-52
(1993); SCHLESINGER, supra note 49, at 127-207.
53 See FISHER, supra note 40, at 34-36.
5' See Martin H. Redish, Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and the
Northern Pipeline Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 197, 198-201 (1983).
" See LOUIS FISHER & NEAL DEVINS, POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 117-20 (3d ed. 2001) (describing grudging presidential acquiescence in
legislation containing legislative veto provisions); FISHER, supra note 40, at 91-96
(same).
56 For a brief account, see FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 55, at 131-34. Devins,
however, argued that a presidential item veto was "not likely to significantly alter
the balance of power between Congress and the White House." Neal E. Devins, In
Search of the Lost Chord: Reflections on the 1996 Item Veto Act, 47 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 1605, 1608 (1997).
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power exercised by other branches? And why have political
actors not only failed to resist incursions on their power, but
frequently acquiesced in a diminution of their own authority?
Government officers seemingly had at their disposal all the tools
necessary to fight off depredations committed by other branches,
yet they chose to cooperate rather than to resist. Clearly, the
"interest of the man" never became sufficiently connected to "the
constitutional rights of the place" to permit the system to work as
intended.57
Probably no more devastating blow can befall a plan of
institutional design than the failure of the designers correctly to
predict the behavior of those who will staff the institution. If
political actors in the federal government were not motivated by
a desire to retain and expand their own spheres of power, then
what did motivate them? I argue in the next section that the
Framers, understandably enough, failed to anticipate a critical
effect of the introduction of republican government into the
constitutional design. The successful introduction of democracy
worked a dramatic transformation in the way power was
conceived, and thus in the way it was used. Simply put, power in
a democracy does not exist for its own sake, or as an attribute of
status, but for the achievement of objectives. In a democracy,
power is not something to be held or acquired, but to be used, and
the way to retain it lies not through further acquisitions, but in
its successful use to achieve specific objectives. Consequently,
political actors became, at a stroke, uninterested in the
boundaries of their own power; instead they became interested in
compiling a record of successful accomplishments, and if
constitutional allocations of power thwarted the accomplishment
of desired goals, then the boundaries would have to go. Or, to put
it differently, constitutional actors in a democracy are no less
interested in self-aggrandizement than the Framers believed; it
is just that they must aggrandize themselves very differently in a
democratic form of government than in a monarchical one.
" THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 51, at 322 (James Madison). Indeed, the
actual exigencies of interbranch politics have occasionally induced government
officials to rid themselves of power so as to escape responsibility for its exercise-
precisely the opposite of what Madison predicted. See Fitts, supra note 48, at 1654-
55; Devins, supra note 56, at 1615-16. In the federalism context, the Supreme Court
has objected, in the anti-commandeering cases, to what it sees as attempts to blur
the lines of intergovernmental responsibility. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S.
898, 933 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992).
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IV. POWER, KINGLY AND REPUBLICAN
The Framers' ideas of government power, and of the
institutional mechanisms suitable to contain it, were informed by
a conception of power that I shall call "kingly." This conception,
which, as colonial subjects of an imperial world power, the
Framers naturally enough inherited, was quickly rendered
obsolete by the introduction of republican government, a change
that dramatically altered the institutional environment in at
least three unforeseen ways. First, the establishment of
representative democracy introduced a set of new democratic
norms that quickly eclipsed the social background norms against
which political life had previously been conducted. Second, the
brute mechanics of representative democracy altered the way in
which power could be successfully used, and thus the way in
which it could realistically be conceived. Third, the introduction
of democratic politics led to the creation of new institutional
structures, mainly associated with party politics, that, because
they had been unforeseen, operated outside of, and altered the
operation of, formal constitutional mechanisms.
Before the Revolution, Americans had lived a life that was in
most ways typically British. They were subjects of the king, and
thus a species of political children in a hierarchical society of
status, patriarchal dependence, and patronage. In such a
system, political stability "depended on the social authority of the
political leaders being visible and incontestable."58 Power in this
system was thus an attribute of sovereignty and its associated
social status, either directly in the case of the royal family, or
indirectly, through a web of patronage and dependence with the
monarch at its source. 9
58 GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALIsM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 86
(1991).
'9 See id. at 77-92; see also FORREST MCDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM 83
(1985). In a recent article, Daryl Levinson makes an argument similar to the one
presented here. See Levinson, supra note 19. He argues that the success of the
constitutional separation of powers depends upon an assumption that federal office
holders would engage in "empire-building," but that an economic analysis of the
actual institutional incentives of government officials shows that their incentives do
not match up well with the design premise of institutional aggrandizement, thus
accounting for the collapse of the system. This analysis, however, leaves Levinson no
tools with which to explain why the Framers might have made such behavioral
assumptions in the first place. In my view, the explanation provided in the text
answers this question, and at the same time vividly demonstrates how poorly the
behavioral assumptions of contemporary economic analysis map onto the socio-
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The Revolution called this arrangement into question.
Legitimate pre-revolutionary claims to deference based on status
were now dismissed as aristocratic pretensions. Political
deference eroded, and government began to be conceived less as a
prerogative of a particular class of gentlemen and more as a
collectively operated business enterprise.60  Although the first
generation of independent American leaders disagreed on
whether government power should be used exclusively for
disinterested public purposes or whether it might also be used for
the pursuit of private interest, they agreed that power was
something to be used for a purpose rather than held as an
attribute of social status.6'
In addition to this social dimension, the introduction of
representative democracy also taught lessons of political morality
destructive of the previous order. An electoral politics, as George
Kateb has argued, "demystifie[s] or desacralize[s] ' '62 political
authority; by its very existence, it induces skepticism about the
received political order, and "signifies a radical chastening of
political authority."63  Constitutional representative democracy
thus encourages an independence of spirit; expands the
boundaries of what is conceived as political; and inspires a sense
of fairness and "[clonstitutional delicacy"6--all characteristics
inconsistent with an understanding of power as a static
entitlement of socially vested authority.
These abstract norms of republican government found
concrete expression in a significant shift in understanding of
what power was for, and how it could legitimately be used. In
monarchical systems, kingly power was an attribute of the
monarch's status as the symbol and sole embodiment of national
sovereignty. Monarchs attempted to expand their territory,
whether by marriage, war, or colonization, to enhance their
status; to take power successfully from another was, indeed, to
demonstrate performatively that one was entitled to it. 6  This
political landscape of the eighteenth century.
60 See WOOD, supra note 58, at 145-68.
6 See id. at 243-70.
62 George Kateb, The Moral Distinctiveness of Representative Democracy, 91
ETHICS 357, 357 (1981).
63 Id. at 358.
6 Id. at 362.
65 Finer describes this as an enduring and commonplace characteristic of
imperial rule, and traces it as far back as the formation of the Chinese state three
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narcissistic outlook acknowledges no obvious stopping point:
"Consumed themselves by their own grandiosity, [monarchs]
rapaciously extract value from other people, in the form of
adoration or tribute. 66
Power in a republican form of government necessarily stands
on a different footing. In a republic, ultimate sovereignty is
located in the people collectively rather than in any official or
collection of officials.67 While it is surely possible for a democratic
popular sovereign to harbor imperial ambitions with respect to
the external world, any internal relationship between the status
of public officials and the extent of their power is formally
severed. Indeed, because all officials in a republic are radically
demoted to the status of mere public servants, no accumulation
of official power could meaningfully enhance their status,
whatever benefits it might bring to their private interests. As a
result, it became pointless for officials to attempt to enhance
their status by accumulating power; their status would remain
formally subordinate and inglorious no matter how many other
public officials they vanquished in intra-governmental power
struggles.
With the holding of power detached from status, the central
issue for those who held official power in the new republic
became instead: what would they do with it? A superior
performance in an institutionally defined role could, as before,
enhance one's public standing, but the nature of the institutional
thousand years ago: "This doctrine [that rulers drew their entitlement to rule from
the Mandate of Heaven] was a rod in pickle for all future rulers. The proof that
Heaven had withdrawn its mandate was the overthrow of a ruler. So, rebellion was
justified-provided it succeeded." 1 S.E. FINER, THE HISTORY OF GOVERNMENT FROM
THE EARLIEST TIMES 449 (1999). A similar conception of political legitimacy
prevailed much later under the Byzantine Empire under a "self-defeating political
formula which, effectively, maintained that whoever held the throne did so by just
and indeed divine title." 2 id. at 663. As a result, "[o]f the 107 sovereigns that
occupied the throne between 395 and 1453, only 34 died in their beds."' 2 id. at 636
(quoting CHARLES DIEHL, BYZANTIUM: GREATNESS AND DECLINE 128 (Naomi
Walford trans., 1957)).
66 Peter Hammond Schwartz, "His Majesty the Baby". Narcissism and Royal
Authority, 17 POL. THEORY 266, 279 (1989).
67 This conception of popular sovereignty is found throughout the canonical
texts of American constitutional law. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. pmbl.; THE DECLARATION
OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 435
(1819).
68 See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 46, at 294 (James Madison) ("The
federal and State governments are in fact but different agents and trustees of the
people.").
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roles had changed, altering the character of the required
performance. A public servant in a democracy could never hope
to rival the social status of the popular sovereign, but even a
servant may profit by demonstrating publicly a certain kind of
mastery. In a republic, that mastery involves not accumulating
power, but using it effectively for popular purposes, a shift in
emphasis well captured by the phrase "measures, not men." This
slogan, which emerged during the British post-Civil War
experience of attempting to legitimate and routinize minoritarian
political opposition, signified to its adherents that the common
good was to be achieved by supporting good measures and
opposing bad ones, regardless of their source, rather than
through the traditional royalist pattern of cultivating and relying
upon personal allegiances and patronage.69 Opposition to power
was legitimate, on this view, when it arose from opposition to
public measures on the merits instead of from a bare desire to
oust, and then to replace, incumbent power holders in order to
exercise their privileges and enjoy their status. By the same
token, those who held power were increasingly obliged to defend
their entitlement to it by using it well.
Finally, this fundamental change in the public conception of
power was itself reinforced by the emerging practice of
democratic politics. If power-holding in a representative
democracy was justifiable mainly on the basis of how well it was
used, then those who held power would have to publicly account
for themselves on the basis of some record of sound achievement.
Achievement under the structure of the U.S. Constitution,
however, required securing action from both houses of Congress
and the President, and it quickly became apparent, to the dismay
of many of the founders, that the organizational structure of
political parties was by far the most effective way to produce
results.7 °
This development, perhaps more than any other, delivered a
severe blow to the integrity of the Constitution's structural
backup systems: party organizations provided an avenue by
69 See JOHN BREWER, PARTY IDEOLOGY AND POPULAR POLITICS AT THE
ACCESSION OF GEORGE III 68-69 (1976).
70 See generally JOHN H. ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES? THE ORIGIN AND
TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN AMERICA (1995); RICHARD HOFSTADTER,
THE IDEA OF A PARTY SYSTEM: THE RISE OF LEGITIMATE OPPOSITION IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1780-1840 (1969).
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which the activity of many government officials, holding different
offices and exercising different formal powers, could be
coordinated for the achievement of common goals.71 As the
political scientist E.E. Schattschneider wrote:
The parties are able to compel public officers to behave in ways
that the law does not contemplate, by methods of which the law
is ignorant, without in any way affecting the validity of their
official acts. What goes on behind the formal act, the official
seals, and public documents the law refuses to know. Since the
parties operate in a legal no man's land they are able to produce
startling effects: in effect they may empty an office of its
contents, transfer the authority of one magistrate to another
magistrate or to persons unknown to the constitution and laws
of the land.
Parties were thus able, by exercising informal and extralegal
control over office holders, not only to alter the Framers' careful
balancing and blending of formal political authority, but to defeat
the basic design premise of the separation of powers-that power
available within the system would be used conflictually rather
than cooperatively. As a result, if the separation of powers still
exists today, it has been sustained less by the anticipated
dynamics of the original design than by sufferance of the political
parties.73
It may still be true, as Madison argued, that the
accumulation of all powers in the same set of hands is "the very
definition of tyranny, 74  but the way in which power is
accumulated today has little to do with breaches of the
separation of powers. In the contemporary American republic,
the power necessary to act tyrannically is assembled not by
"' See Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards
of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 216-19 (2000).
72 E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, PARTY GOVERNMENT 12 (1942).
73 Another strand of thought in the political science literature questions
whether parties really have the "capacity... [to] overcome the separation of powers
by bringing together under informal arrangements what the founders were at pains
to divide by formal ones." James Q. Wilson, Political Parties and the Separation of
Powers, in SEPARATION OF POWERS-DOES IT STILL WORK? 18, 18 (Robert A.
Goldwin & Art Kaufman eds., 1986). The argument here is that the well-documented
decline in partisan loyalty among members of Congress may rob parties of the
discipline necessary to engage in the kind of coordinated interbranch action that
would evade the coordination limitations presupposed by the constitutional division
of powers. See generally DAVID S. BRODER, THE PARTY'S OVER (1972); MARTIN P.
WATTENBERG, THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES: 1952-1988 (1990).
" THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 47, at 301 (James Madison).
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centralizing it in the hands of a single branch, but by achieving
partisan control of all three branches of government, separate
though they may be. On some level, the public seems to have
recognized this change in the source of the danger. For the most
part, today's American public is not worried simply by the fact
that one branch exercises a power formally assigned to another.
A democratic public is interested in results, and if Congress, say,
cannot produce the desired results then the public seems more
than happy to let the President get the job done, even if this
entrenches in the presidency a power that is in some sense better
left elsewhere. 5 Instead, the kind of entrenchment that seems
nowadays to offend the public's sense of political justice is
entrenchment of partisan control over government offices, often
undertaken through gerrymandering or manipulation of the
rules of campaign finance. It has even been suggested that the
voting public has responded to the possibility of this kind of
entrenchment by deliberately dividing partisan control over the
organs of the federal government to recreate, under today's
altered circumstances, the original spirit of the separation of
powers design format.76
V. STRUCTURAL BACKUP SYSTEMS IN A DEMOCRACY
If the introduction of democracy fundamentally subverted
the very constitutional systems designed to protect the public
from failures of democracy, what conclusions can we draw for
constitutional design in democratic systems? Perhaps the most
pressing question is whether democracy is such a powerful
71 Politicians have not been above cynically exploiting, for political gain, the
public's impatience with formal constitutional divisions of authority. Readers of this
journal may well remember that New York Senator Alphonse D'Amato (1981-1999)
proudly referred to himself as "Senator Pothole," inviting the public to call upon him
to handle problems that were entirely outside the scope of his official duties as a
U.S. Senator.
76 See MORRIS FIORINA, DIVIDED GOVERNMENT 63-81 (Allyn & Bacon 2d ed.
1996) (1992). For a considerably stronger view, see Theodore J. Lowi, President v.
Congress: What the Two-Party Duopoly Has Done to the American Separation of
Powers, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1219, 1224-27 (1997). Lowi argues that we now
have a system of "dual-party government with each party nested in one of the
Branches," a system that encourages the branches to attempt as much as possible to
operate independently of one another. Id. at 1225, 1229. Although this produces "the
consequences [the Framers] had hoped [separation of powers] would produce," it
"has rendered the national government virtually incapable of governing." Id. at
1224, 1226.
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influence on the institutional environment that we must simply
abandon as unworkable the otherwise appealing Madisonian
conception of protecting liberty automatically, through a
structurally self-sustaining, non-democratic backup system. We
must confront, in other words, the possibility that democracy is
an act that must be performed without a net.
One possible way out of this difficulty might lie in greater
resort to the judiciary. With separation of powers largely
disabled as a self-sustaining, liberty-protective mechanism,
perhaps we ought to place a correspondingly greater emphasis on
the enumeration of liberties in a bill of rights, subject to
enforcement by an impartial and independent judiciary.
Certainly this seems to be the dominant model around the world.
Most democracies do not favor an American-style presidential
system with a strict separation of powers, but tend instead to use
a Westminster-style parliamentary system that lacks a formal
separation of executive and legislative functions. 7' At the same
time, parliamentary democracies have tended increasingly to rely
on elaborate enumerations of individual rights accompanied by
strong and independent judicial enforcement of those rights
against democratically authorized incursions.78
The main recommendation for judicial review as a backup
system for protecting liberty in a democracy is of course its
independence from democratic mechanisms. Unlike executives
and legislatures, courts owe their primary allegiance not to a
democratic public, but to professional norms of judging that are
for the most part free from democratic control. Although this
independence makes judicial review a potentially robust
mechanism for policing social problems arising from democratic
failures, its defect from the Madisonian point of view is that its
independence is not self-sustaining, but rather depends upon
continuing voluntary compliance by judges with professional
judicial norms. The advantage of a self-sustaining system, as the
Framers conceived it, is that it continues to operate, and thus to
77 Among the thirty-six oldest and most stable democracies identified in a recent
study by Lijphart, see AREND LIJPHART, PATTERNS OF DEMOCRACY 50-55 (1999), all
but five are presently considered parliamentary democracies under widely used
criteria employed by the World Bank. See http://www.worldbank.org.
78 RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF
THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM (2004). For a recent attempt to demonstrate
empirically the benefits of independent judicial review, see Rafael La Porta et al.,
Judicial Checks and Balances, 112 J. POL. ECON. 445 (2004).
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protect the public good, even when political actors stop self-
consciously obeying prevailing norms. Judicial review does not
possess this characteristic to any great degree-it loses its
effectiveness the moment judges stop following professional
norms and start responding to other influences, such as public
opinion or private self-interest.
Is it possible, then, to create a self-sustaining constitutional
backup mechanism in an environment where democratic norms
so powerfully shape political behavior? Given the strength of
democratic norms throughout the system, perhaps a more
promising approach would be to take a different leaf from
Madison's book and attempt to design "a republican remedy for
the diseases most incident to republican government"7 9 by
assuming that democratic incentives will continue to structure
official behavior at most stages of the political process.
If, as I argued above, the main objections to the exercise of
power in a democracy are likely to focus not on its distribution
but on the specific purposes for which it is used, then the best
way to prevent bad measures from being implemented is to
assure the presence somewhere within the government of
individuals who are likely to object to, and be in a position to
obstruct, specific bad uses of governmental power. However,
because it is impossible to know in advance which measures will
be good and which will be bad, and thus who will be in the best
position to recognize and to object to bad measures, the best
strategy seems to be one that will result in populating
government offices with the widest possible diversity of
individuals. A strategy of inclusion, then, may be the modern
democratic equivalent of the kingly balance of power conceived
by the Framers.
Inclusion, of course, has long been a goal of democratic
design for a multitude of reasons, ° and many methods have been
suggested for achieving it. Madison himself argued that a large
'9 THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 10, at 84 (James Madison).
80 Many recent arguments for inclusion stress the social benefits that follow
when a wide variety of voices are heard in public and in legislative councils. See, e.g.,
ANNE PHILLIPS, THE POLITICS OF PRESENCE (1995); IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION
AND DEMOCRACY (2000). But even under long-standing theories, such as interest
pluralism and social choice, systematic exclusion stands as an obstacle to
achievement of the ultimate goal of maximizing social utility by preventing a
complete aggregation of all social interests. See, e.g., RICHARD S. KATZ, DEMOCRACY
AND ELECTIONS 42-44, 128 (1997).
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republic, by its sheer size, would thwart the formation in
Congress of efficacious majority factions by assuring a
membership with a wide diversity of interests.
8" Consociational
systems sometimes assure a diversity of interests among
government officials by requiring offices to rotate among
members of major social groups, or by establishing quotas for
legislative and cabinet positions.82 Proportional representation
has long been conceived as a way to bring an appropriate
diversity of viewpoints into the halls of government.
8 3
In the American case, a deeply entrenched social aversion to
enforced proportionality may make some of these solutions
impracticable.84  Alternatively, given the important role of
American political parties in controlling the behavior of elected
officials, measures to assure the inclusiveness of political parties
seem advisable. Such measures might include requirements of
easy voter access to and mobility among political parties, internal
party democracy, and transparency in party deliberative
processes. The national Democratic Party, for example, already
fosters internal diversity on a roughly proportional model by
requiring delegates to the national convention to be split evenly
by gender, and by instituting an affirmative action program to
promote adequate representation at the convention of racial and
ethnic groups.85 Ultimately, measures such as these may hold
the greatest promise for recreating the kind of backup protection
against democratic failure that the Framers were so keen to
include in the U.S. Constitution.
8' See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 10, at 81-82 (James Madison).
82 See AREND LIJPHART, DEMOCRACIES 24-25 (1984); AREND LIJPHART,
DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES 38-41 (1977).
83 See, e.g., LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY 81-82 (1994)
(criticizing racially disproportionate influence of whites in the American non-
proportional system of representation); John Stuart Mill, Considerations on
Representative Government, in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 303 (John Gray ed.,
Oxford Univ. Press 1991) ("In a really equal democracy, every or any section would
be represented, not disproportionately, but proportionately.").
8 For an account of the brief life and quick death of proportional representation
in the United States, see KATHLEEN L. BARBER, A RIGHT TO REPRESENTATION
(2000).
85 See DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE, THE CHARTER AND THE BYLAWS OF
THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF THE UNITED STATES (2003), art. 2, § 4, art. 8, §§ 3, 4,
available at http://www.democrats.org/pdfs/charter.pdf.
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